Introduction
War's devastating effects are not restricted to the many people killed or wounded. The consequences of war extend far beyond battlefield casualties to include forced migration, the destruction of infrastructure, and the deterioration of institutional quality and economic growth. Wars also have a detrimental effect on international trade. Economic history shows that interstate conflicts are often accompanied by the imposition of partial or total trade embargoes on the exchange of goods or services.
Furthermore, all types of armed conflicts (interstate and non-state conflicts) may reduce trade flows by raising the costs of engaging in international trade. This paper explores the effects of war on trade in the Middle East and North African (MENA) region.
Whether stemming from decolonization and issues of statehood or related to the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests generated by the Arab Spring, interstate conflict and civil war have frequently ripped this region apart since 1945. However, and surprisingly, MENA's share of trade in gross domestic product (GDP) compares favorably to other regions. Data from the World Development Indicators (2014) show that in 2012, the share of trade (95 percent) in MENA's gross domestic product (GDP) was higher than developed regions like North America (33 percent) and developing regions like Africa south of the Sahara (66 percent). We suspect that such bright figures mask a serious heterogeneity among countries and among sectors.
The relationship between conflict and international trade has garnered much more attention from political scientists than from economists. On the one hand, empirical studies in political science have tested reverse causation, i.e. the impact of bilateral trade on the frequency of war between country pairs.
Many find a negative relationship (Polachek, 1980; Mansfield, 1995; Polachek, Robst and Chang, 1999; Oneal and Russet, 1999) , but others find a positive relationship (Barbieri, 1996; . On the other hand, various other studies (Pollins, 1989a and 1989b; Mansfield and Bronson, 1997; and Kesht, Pollins and Reuveny, 2004 ) study the problem from the other direction, focusing on the effect of war on trade and showing that conflicts dampen trade. In contrast, Morrow, Siverson, and Taberes (1998; 1999) and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) find that the effect of militarized interstate disputes on trade is not statistically significant. Barbieri and Levy (1999) find no evidence that war involving non-major-power countries reduces bilateral trade over time, while Anderton and Carter (2001) find that wars involving major powers dampen trade both with other major powers and minor powers.
In economics, Blomberg and Hess (2006) and Glick and Taylor (2008) use a gravity equation to investigate the effect of conflicts on trade, controlling for the standard determinants of trade in the literature. Blomberg and Hess (2006) calculate that, for a given country year, the presence of terrorism and internal and external conflict is equivalent to as much as a 30 percent tariff on trade. Glick and Taylor (2008) estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of wars on trade, controlling for the possible effects of reverse causality, and show that wars dampen trade. Meanwhile, Martin et al. (2008) finds that the conventional wisdom that trade promotes peace is only partially true. When war occurs because of the presence of asymmetric information, the probability of escalation is lower for countries that trade more bilaterally because of the opportunity cost associated with the loss of trade gains.
However, countries more open to global trade have a higher probability of war because multilateral trade openness decreases bilateral dependence to any given country, as well as the cost of a bilateral conflict.
Despite being ripped apart by different types of interstate and intrastate conflicts since 1945, the MENA region has been widely neglected in the literature on conflicts and trade. According to Gates et al. (2010) , there was a strong and fairly steady increase in the number of conflicts in the MENA region from 1945 until the early 1990s, followed by a strong decline for the next 10 years. The level of conflict was fairly moderate until the late 1970s, associated with decolonization or issues of statehood, particularly the Palestinian conflict. The increase in conflict seen during the 1970s and 1980s is probably a result of the Cold War era, during which the superpowers supported a broad range of wars and minor conflicts. During the 1980s and the 1990s, the incidence of conflict in the MENA region increased, with the Iran-Iraq war and the Algerian Civil War as the two most intense examples. While the second half of the 1990s was more peaceful than the first half, the decade as a whole again witnessed more violence. Of course, the story is not over yet, with the revolutionary wave of demonstrations, protests, and wars occurring in the Arab world since December 2010. Noting such a critical history of violence in MENA countries, one might be surprised to know that in 2012, the share of trade in MENA GDP (95 percent) was the highest among developed and developing regions. The share of service trade is not as bright as the share of goods trade, accounting for only 15 percent of MENA GDP, but it is worth noting that this percentage is higher than that in other developed regions, as well as developing regions. Although such figures may seem dazzling, heterogeneity still exists among countries and sectors; this disaggregated data reveals a dimmer picture. This paper investigates the effects of war on the trade performance of MENA countries. We adopt the definition of different types of conflicts suggested by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University: armed conflicts between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state; non-state conflicts between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state; and one-sided violence where we distinguish between one-sided state violence, when the actor is the government of a state, and one-sided non-state violence in the opposite case. With this diversity of conflicts in the region, we must be cautious when investigating the effects on MENA trade. While interstate conflicts are often accompanied by the imposition of trade embargoes on the exchange of goods or services, and therefore affect trade between country pairs, the other types of conflicts do not necessarily involve country pairs. Therefore, we run two sets of regressions. First, since interstate conflicts affect trade between country pairs, we run sectoral regressions in which we investigate the effect of conflicts on bilateral trade flows in 27 manufacturing sectors for the period 1980-2006. Taking into consideration that trade might have different impacts on the manufacturing and service sectors, and since bilateral trade flows in services are not available at a disaggregated level, we use the unilateral variant of the gravity model for disaggregated trade in 12 service sectors for the period 2000-2013.
Second, we run macroeconomic regressions in which we investigate the impact of conflicts on countries' ability to trade (i.e., do countries trade more or less, in general), and sectoral regressions in which we take into consideration the bilateral dimension of war and assess the effects of conflicts on bilateral trade. Similar to van Lynden (2011), we propose an adaptation of the gravity model using unilateral variants of the variables that influence bilateral trade. These unilateral variants will be country-specific, instead of country-pair-specific, and will be controlled for to assess the effect of different types of conflicts on the trade volume of MENA countries for the period 1960-2013.
Our results show that, in general, wars have a significantly negative impact on exports, imports, and trade. In particular, civil conflicts (non-state conflicts) hinder exports, imports, and trade significantly.
The disaggregated version of the gravity model shows that non-state conflicts, unlike other types of conflicts, have a detrimental effect on bilateral trade flows in manufacturing; however, none of the conflicts affect trade in services. Finally, the outcome of the gravity model for the manufacturing sector has been used to compute ad-valorem equivalents of wars at the country level. We found that, on average, a conflict is equivalent to a tariff of 5 percent of the value of trade. More heterogeneity is observed at the sectoral level, where AVEs range from 4 to 65 percent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some stylized facts regarding trade and war in the MENA region. Section 3 explains the econometric specifications and Section 4 is devoted to the discussion of the results. Section 5 presents some further results. Finally, Section 6 concludes and presents some policy implications.
Wars and Conflicts in the MENA Region
One of the world's most critical regions of frequent conflict is the Middle East and North Africa.
Although the number of conflicts in the MENA region has fluctuated in recent decades, broadly in line with global trends (Gates et al., 2010) , this number remains disproportionate to the region's population.
The region accounts for only 5.5 percent of the world's population; yet it has experienced around 15 percent of the world's conflicts since 1945 and nearly one-third of all intra-state wars in the world from the late 1970s until the mid-1990s (World Bank, 2011) . Figure 1 shows the strong and reasonably steady increase in the number of conflicts in the MENA region since 1960. The level of conflict was fairly moderate until the late 1970s; in this first decade, some of the region's conflicts were related to decolonization, while others related to issues of statehood, particularly the Palestinian conflict and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In addition to the persistence of the Palestinian conflict, the MENA region witnessed an increasing number of conflicts in the late 1970s and 1980s resulting from the Cold War era, during which the superpowers and their allies fought and supported a broad range of wars and minor conflicts. During the 1980s and well into the 1990s, the incidence of conflict in the MENA region increased even more with the Iran-Iraq war and the Algerian Civil War (Gates et al., 2010) . While the second half of the 1990s was more peaceful than the first, that decade again witnessed more violence in the region. Finally, since December 2010, MENA countries have been experiencing the revolutionary wave of protests, uprisings, and demonstrations collectively referred to as "The Arab Spring". MENA Country (1960 -2013 Source: Constructed by the authors using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Universitet.
The nature of violence in the region has also changed over time. Figure 1 that, depending on GDP, distance, and a number of other factors, a typical MENA country under-trades with other countries: exports to the outside world are at only one-third of their potential. However, intra-MENA trade is conditionally higher than extra-MENA trade. These results hold for aggregate exports, non-natural exports, and non-petroleum exports.
The share of service trade in MENA GDP is low at nearly 15 percent; however, this percentage is higher than other developed and developing regions ( Figure 4 ). The share of exports in GDP is much lower, around 6 percent, although this is higher than most other regions and the world average ( Figure 5 ).
Sectors like tourism, transportation, remittance, and, to a lower extent, financial, transportation, and telecommunication services are the driving forces behind this stylized fact. 
Methodology and Data
The methodology used in this article draws on the gravity model pioneered by Tinbergen (1962) and Anderson (1979) . An essential tool in the empirics of international trade to predict bilateral trade flows using multiple determinants of trade, the gravity model has undergone significant theoretical and empirical improvements over the years (Mac Callum, 1995; Feenstra et al., 2001; Feenstra, 2002; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Evenett and Keller, 2002; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) , enforcing its theoretical base and narrowing the gap between theoretical and empirical findings.
In order to assess the impact of war and different types of conflicts on trade in the MENA region, we adopt the definition of conflicts suggested by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University: armed conflicts between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state; nonstate conflicts between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state; and one-sided violence in which we distinguish between one-sided state violence, when the actor is the government of a state, and one-sided non-state violence in the opposite case.
Although conflicts occurring in the MENA region do not necessarily involve country pairs, we cannot deny that some types of conflict have a bilateral dimension and might affect bilateral trade between the two partners involved. Furthermore, we believe that the devastating effects of conflict on trade will vary depending on countries' comparative advantages, as some sectors are more affected by war than others.
Therefore, we run the regressions at a disaggregated sectoral level for both manufacturing and services. We run regressions at the sector level to examine the different impact of conflicts on sectors.
For services, bilateral trade data is not available at a disaggregated level. Therefore, the dependent 
This equation is first run by pooling countries and sectors in the same regression; it is then run at the sectoral level (12 regressions). ‡ We use OLS techniques (instead of PPML) and introduce exporter and sector dummies since the share of zero flows is very small. finding is supported by the fact that civil wars are likely to destroy infrastructure, stop production processes and consequently affect exports (Martin et al., 2008) . The effect of non-state conflicts on bilateral trade is even harsher, reducing trade by 22 percent when we combine all the conflicts simultaneously in one specification. In fact, the conflict coefficient is greater than the tariff one,
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showing that civil conflict hinders trade more than classical tariffs. This is true for two reasons. First, conflicts hinder both exports and imports, whereas tariffs affect only imports. Second, while tariffs can reduce trade flows for specific products and/or sectors, wars dampen trade regardless of the type of the product. On the supply side, the whole production process is affected, leading to fewer exports, while on the demand side, individuals' purchasing power is negatively impacted, leading to fewer imports.
When we run the regressions by manufacturing sectors, we find that one-sided non-state violence hampers 44 percent of manufacturing sectors (wearing apparel, industrial chemicals, other chemicals, plastic products, other non-metallic mineral products, iron and steel, fabricated metal products, machinery except electrical, and professional and scientific equipment). Sectors like tobacco and wood products are affected by non-state conflicts, furniture by non-state conflicts and one-sided state violence, and food products and beverages by armed conflicts. Trade in leather product is affected by both one-sided non-state violence and non-state conflicts. Trade in machinery electric is affected by one-sided non-state violence and by armed conflicts. The effect of conflicts seems to vary among manufacturing sectors according to the comparative advantage of the country in question. Finally, it is worth noting that we got very few counter-intuitive positive and significant coefficients of conflicts on bilateral trade of some sectors (Tables 3-5) . § This elasticity has been calculated as follows: e β -1 where β is the "non-state" coefficient. As bilateral trade data is not available for disaggregated service sectors, we use the unilateral variant of the gravity model specified in the previous section. Table 6 shows that the gravity variables have their expected signs. However, none of the conflict variables appear to have a significant effect on service exports. Surprisingly, one-sided non-state conflicts have a significant positive effect on service exports when all conflicts variables are included in one specification. When we run the regressions by sector, we find that one-sided state violence hampers travel services and other business services and that non-state conflicts have a detrimental effect on financial services.
The results also show that armed conflicts have a negative effect on communication, insurance, and construction services, as well as remittances. Counterintuitively, we find that one-sided non-state violence increases exports of travel, transportation, communication, construction, and insurance services, as well as government services. We can summarize our main findings in three main points. First, war has a robust and significantly negative impact on exports, imports, and trade. Second, non-state conflicts are more likely to affect trade than the other specified types of war. Third, while bilateral manufacturing trade flows are affected by war in general and by non-state conflicts in particular, none of the war variables appear to affect service exports.
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Calculating Ad-Valorem Equivalents for Conflicts
To more appropriately assess the impact of war on trade, we adopt the methodology of Kee et al. (2009) to estimate ad-valorem equivalents (AVEs) for conflicts based on the gravity model. To make conflicts comparable with AVEs, the quantity impact must be transformed into price equivalents. This yields the 
where ε is the import demand elasticity in country j and p the domestic price in country j.
Hence, solving (18) This yields the ad-valorem equivalent of a conflict for the countries whose elasticity of demand is available. It is worth noting that AVEs have been computed based on the output of the bilateral gravity model, as this is the closest specification to Kee et al. (2009) .
We find that a conflict is equivalent to a tariff ranging from 4 percent to 65 percent of trade flows in the manufacturing sectors. The sectors that are highly affected by different conflicts are consumption goods such as food, beverages, wearing and apparels, leather, and chemicals. 
Further Results
Since the different types of conflicts in the MENA region do not necessarily involve country pairs, we
propose an adaptation of the gravity model, using unilateral variants of the variables that influence bilateral trade, such as that used by van Lynden (2011).
Our explanatory variables are the natural log of country i's GDP and unilateral variants of the gravity- 
To capture the long-lasting effect of war and conflict on trade, we introduce some dynamic effects into the standard panel model by including the lagged value of trade among the regressors. Theoretically, this can be done as follows:
where y* is the desired level of y.
By substituting the expression for y* into the other equation, we obtain the following estimating equation:
There is a problem with the estimation of this type of model, as the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the error term (in small samples). Table 10 shows that GDP has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant. Moreover, distance has the expected negative impact on trade, exports, and imports. Finally, sharing the same Arabic language is likely to boost trade. As per our variables of interest, it is worth mentioning that the lagged dummy of war is negative and significant for exports, imports, and trade.
If we disentangle the effect of different conflicts on trade flows, we find that non-state conflicts have a much more detrimental effect on exports than do other types of conflict. This is in line with Martin et al. (2008) , who point out that trade destruction due to civil wars (which are mainly non-state) is very large and persistent and increases with the severity of the conflict. Civil wars are likely to destroy infrastructure, stop production processes, and affect production, labor demand, and thus exports.
Furthermore, we find that imports are more likely to be affected by non-state, one-sided, and one-sided non-state conflicts mainly because the purchasing power of the population is likely to decrease, leading to less demand and therefore lower imports. Consequently, total trade is chiefly affected by non-state and one-sided conflicts.
** West Bank and Gaza is dropped from the sample as it doesn't show in any of the Uppsala conflict databases (conflicts affecting West Bank and Gaza are counted in Israel). † † See Appendix 1 for the list of countries. 
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
This paper investigates the effects of war on trade in the MENA region, which faces considerable risk of conflict. Using an augmented gravity model, we introduce a war variable and distinguish between different types of conflicts. We run a battery of sensitivity analysis tests to control for the endogeneity problem that may arise in our estimation. The results show that, in general, wars have a significantly negative impact on exports, imports, and trade. Moreover, civil conflicts (non-state conflicts) also hinder exports, imports, and trade significantly. The disaggregated version of the gravity model shows that non-state conflicts, unlike other types of conflict, have a detrimental effect on bilateral trade flows in manufacturing, but none of the conflicts affect trade in services. Finally, the outcome of the gravity model for the manufacturing sectors has been used to compute ad-valorem equivalents of wars at the sector and country levels.
We found that, on average, a conflict is equivalent to a tariff of 5 percent of the value of trade. More heterogeneity is observed at the sectoral level, where AVEs range from 4 percent to 65 percent). Since conflicts in the MENA region have a significant detrimental effect on trade, from a policy standpoint, those conflicts are likely to reduce the positive impact of trade on growth that characterized the MENA region in the last decades. Moreover, "war is development in reverse" (Collier et al., 2003) as it has an impact on life expectancy, infant mortality rates, GDP per capita, access to water, trade, and institutions.
